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A TALE OF TWO CLIENTS: THINKING 
ABOUT LAW AS LANGUAGE 
Clark D. Cunningham* 
I. PROLOGUE: THINKING ABOUT STORIES AND 
TALKING A.BOUT TALES 
A. True Stories 
This is a true story. It is actually three true stories. The article 
taken as a whole tells a story of my personal search for a new way of 
talking about the experience of being a lawyer, a quest which is leading 
me to think more and more about law as a kind of language and lawy-
ering as a form of translation. Rather like a medieval romance, em-
bedded within this story of a quest are two tales, about clients I have 
represented in the course of my clinical teaching. 
As much as possible, both levels of narrative are presented in 
chronological order. At the level of the embedded tales, each case is 
presented as it developed. At the level of the story of my quest, I 
recount how this article was written. In creating this structure, com-
bining embedded tales with passages of conceptual discourse, I try to 
recreate the dynamic relation between my lawyering experiences and 
my efforts to understand and talk about what they "meant." 
The storytelling aspect of the article is thus intended to enact the 
model of mental activity presented in the conceptual passages: that 
concepts are constituted out of experience through the use of symbolic 
forms of representation, of which language is the most important, and, 
through language, can be altered in response to new experience. The 
concept of lawyering as translation is thus presented as rising out of 
my actual experiences as a lawyer and being tested through a process 
of talking about those experiences which requires a dynamic alterna-
tion between the evocation of experience and the imposition of a con-
ceptual structure. 
• Associate Professor, Washington University School of Law. B.A. 1975, Dartmouth; J.D. 
1981, Wayne State University. - Ed. Helpful comments and advice on this article have been 
received from James Boyd White, Frederick Schauer, Richard 0. Lempert, Paul D. Reingold, M. 
Susan Carlson, William C. Jones, Stephen H. Legomsky, Ronald M. Levin, Charles R. 
McManis, Roy D. Simon, Daniel L. Keating, Milner S. Ball, Derrick Bell, David Gray Carlson, 
Steven L. Winter, Timothy A. Mahoney, Kim Lane Scheppele, and Suellyn Scamecchia. Many 
of the ideas expressed herein have been substantially influenced by the work of James Boyd 
White, and in particular his forthcoming book, Justice as Translation. 
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Because my quest is continuing, its true story continues as you 
read this article and, hopefully, write or call me in response. I am 
trying to come to know my own complex experience and to communi-
cate with you about that experience. The act of communication is it-
self the central aspect of the knowing. As I speak, over and over 
again, to different audiences, and hear responses to my words, my own 
understanding changes and grows. 
My quest begins by exploring the familiar phrase, "lawyering as 
representation." The central activity of lawyering is generally de-
scribed as representing clients.1 But I have found myself struggling to 
find a word other than "representation" to describe my work as a law-
yer because the word is both overly familiar and deeply ambiguous.2 
The word "represent" comes to English from Latin by way of the 
French language and originally seemed to mean simply to "re-pres-
ent," to present again.3 The slang description of a lawyer as a 
"mouthpiece" seems to capture this sense of "represent," by indicating 
that a lawyer merely re-presents what the client has told her. Yet ob-
viously what the lawyer presents is rarely just a repetition of the cli-
ent's words. Some kind of transformation occurs, but what kind? 
Represent can also be used to describe the transforming work of the 
artist. Can we think of the lawyer as an artist who creates a "represen-
tation" of the client in the same way that a sculptor creates a represen-
tation of a human body or a novelist creates a representation of a 
human life? This meaning of representation fails to capture at least 
my own feeling about being a lawyer because my practice requires me 
to assert that my representation of the client is the client in a way that 
the statue or the novel cannot be the human it portrays. Indeed, the 
strong sense of identity between client and lawyer is suggested by a 
third meaning of represent: to take the place of or to act the part of 
another person. 4 
The very familiarity of the phrase "representing a client" prevents 
us from recognizing the profound ambiguities created by describing 
lawyering as representation. In Parts II and III, I tell two true stories 
I. According to Webster's Dictionary, "lawyer" applies to anyone in the law "profession" 
while "attorney •.. strictly applies to one transacting legal business for a client." WEBSTER'S 
SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 478 (1967) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S]. 
2. Although the dictionary lists "advocate" as a synonym for "represent," other suggestive 
meanings are also included in the definition: (I) "to portray or exhibit [as in] art," (2) "to serve 
as the counterpart or image of," (3) "to act the part or role of," (4) "to take the place of in some 
respect," (5) "to act in the place of," (6) "to form an image of in the mind," or (7) "to apprehend 
by means of an idea." WEBSTER'S, supra note 1, at 728. 
3. The Latin root is repraesentare from "re- + praesentare, to present." Id. at 728. 
4. Id. at 728. 
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from my experience of representing clients. As I suggest in the titles 
of these stories, in one case the lawyer's work was reduced to mere 
"re-presentation," while in the other "the representation" of the client 
that "appeared" in court seemed to be an autonomous creation uncon-
nected to the client's own words. Although both stories are therefore 
about "representation," in neither tale does the lawyer achieve the 
kind of identity with his client that seems to me to be at the core of 
what it means to be a lawyer: the achievement of two persons some-
how speaking with one voice. Instead, in one story the client is struck 
mute while in the other the lawyer is silenced. 
In Part IV, I tell how these two cases influenced my thinking and 
talking about the meaning of being a lawyer. I recount how these ex-
periences forced me to try to relate language to the basic ways in 
which knowledge and experience interact, as explained in Part V. The 
final Part uses these ideas about language, experience, and knowledge 
to develop a concept of translation that can be used to rethink what it 
means to represent a client, for two persons to speak with one voice. 
B. What Makes a Story True? 
Before I begin telling my true stories, I want to linger a few mo-
ments over the phrase "true story." The concept of a "true story" 
seems intimately bound up with the activity of representing a client. 
Implicitly, every complaint, every brief, every opening argument, even 
every negotiation begins with the assertion, "this is a true story."5 
What the lawyer says is admittedly a story, shaped and crafted, but it 
is still true. 6 Indeed, much of what drew me to the practice of law in 
the first place - the dedication of intellect and imagination to creativ-
ity that takes place in the world, that arises directly from the world, 
and that could even change the world - might be thought of as the 
opportunity to tell stories which yet are true. 7 
Originally all stories were true because in the early Middle Ages 
the word "story" itself meant "[a] narrative, true or presumed to be 
true."8 Story was used as we today use the word "history," which is 
5. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 ("The signature of an attorney ... constitutes a certificate by the 
signer that ... the pleading ... is well grounded in fact .... "). 
6. The enduring appeal of plays, movies, and television programs that either take place or 
climax in a courtroom probably arises from the popular sense that a trial reveals the inherent 
drama in "real life." 
7. The meaning of "the world" in this sentence is problematic because it suggests that "the 
world" exists independent of the individual mind and yet can interact with the mind. See infra 
text accompaning note 31; see generally Part V. 
8. 15 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 797 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter OXFORD]. It is interest-
ing to note that the earliest examples of this use given in the Oxford English Dictionary (1225 
A.D.) are of"stories" from the Bible, which in the Middle Ages were thought to be the "truest" 
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not surprising since "story" is adapted from the Old French word "es-
toire," which was in tum derived from the Latin word "historia." Its 
meaning then made a subtle shift to "[a] recital of events that have or 
are alleged to have happened."9 This shift suggests a heightened 
awareness of the shaping hand of the narrator and emphasis on the 
narrator's credibility as the source of veracity. The next historical 
shift in meaning reversed the initial presumption of truth: "A narra-
tive of real or, more usually, fictitious events, ... a tale." 1° Finally, in 
colloquial use, the presumption of untruth became an assumption: "A 
euphemism for: A lie." 11 Thus, while "true story" would have 
seemed redundant to our medieval predecessors, the phrase now al-
most sounds like a contradiction in terms, an intriguingly paradoxical 
assertion. 
The shifting meanings of the word "story" are mirrored in the 
changing fortunes of its twin, "history." In its earliest English usage, 
"history" meant simply narrative, tale, or story: a "relation of inci-
dents ... either true or imaginary. " 12 It was only later that a "history" 
was "professedly true" and then came to mean specifically a "written 
narrative constituting a continuous, methodical record, in order of 
time, of important or public events."13 
If we look to the common ancestor of both words, we may under-
stand better why in the beginning there seemed to be no distinction 
between story and history. The Latin "historia" is adopted from a 
Greek word for "know" - "fo'!'opLa," which means "a learning by 
inquiry ... an account of one's inquiries, a narrative."14 The ancient 
Greek writer, Herodotus, who is usually acclaimed as the first histo-
rian in the Western tradition, called his famous account of the rela-
tions between Persia and Greece a "History" because it set forth his 
personal investigations and inquiries. 15 The Greek word, (cr'!'opLa, 
thus merged our modem divergent notions of story and history into a 
single term defined as the product of an inquiring mind, seeking to 
create not "truth" but understanding. Therefore, this article, as a per-
narratives told, although in the modem era many are considered to be lacking in historical 
accuracy. 
9. Id. (emphasis added). (first usage in 1375). 
IO. Id. at 798 (emphasis added) (first usage circa 1500). 
11. Id. (first usage in 1697). 
12. 6 OXFORD, supra note 8, at 261 (emphasis addded) (first usage in 1390). 
13. Id. (first usage in 1485). It appears that the methodological rigor of composition gave the 
contemporary meaning of history its presumptive veracity. 
14. H. RIDDELL & R. Scorr, GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 385 (7th ed. 1959). 
15. I am indebted to J.B. White's superior knowledge of Greek language and literature for 
some of the information in this paragraph. 
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sonal account of my striving to create meaning out of experience, at-
tempts to be a story in this most archetypal sense. 
If I find "story" to be such an apt description of this article, why 
then have I called this a tale rather than a story? Originally, I was 
attracted to the alliterative rhythm of the title, and its echo of Dick-
ens' famous novel. But, when I turned to the Oxford English Diction-
ary to look up "tale," I found it a fitting alternative to "story." 
Unlike "story" and "history," which were brought into English by 
the French-speaking Norman invaders, "tale" is an older, Anglo-
Saxon word related to "talk." A tale was originally simply "[t]he ac-
tion of telling" or "[t]hat which one tells." 16 Tale then became "[a] 
story or narrative, true or fictitious." 17 It was only as "story" became 
severed from "history" that "tale" came to mean "a mere story, as 
opposed to a narrative of fact; a fiction, an idle tale; [and finally] a 
falsehood." 18 
By using "tale" instead of "story" for my title, I recall and empha-
size the importance of language; of "talking" ("tale") as a way of 
"knowing by inquiry" ("historia"). Because my quest explores the 
complex relationship among experience, knowledge, and language, I 
have chosen in the title of this article to deliberately juxtapose talking 
about experience, "a tale," with thinking (about law as language) in a 
parallel construction to suggest a relationship between the two without 
explication. Like many of the other authors in this symposium, I tum 
to storytelling to say what I mean; indeed, I tell these stories to try to 
know what I mean. 
II. CREATING A REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT: THE CASE OF 
THE SILENCED CLIENT 
My clinical students, who work in teams of two, usually interview 
a prospective client without my being present in order to establish 
from the outset their primacy as the client's lawyers and to eliminate 
the distorting effects of my presence. 19 However, if the client consents, 
we videotape the interview. After the intake interview the student 
lawyers make a brief presentation to me describing the client and the 
"case" as they understand it, along with their recommendation as to 
, 16. 17 OXFORD, supra note 8, at 579 (first usage in 1060). Cf Dutch "taal" (speech), Old 
Norse "ta/a" (talk, speech, tale), Danish "tale" (speech, discourse). Id. 
17. Id. (first usage circa 1200). 
18. Id. (see usage dated 1529: "it is but a tale."). 
19. Both this case and the one discussed in Part III come from my prior teaching experience 
at the University of Michigan Law School. The clinic procedures described are those followed in 
General Clinic I at that school. 
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whether we should represent the person. If we decide to take the case, 
soon afterwards we review the videotape to analyze the students' inter-
viewing techniques and to check their initial impressions of the client 
and his story against a verbatim record. 
In the "Case of the Silenced Client," our client was charged with 
the misdemeanor of Operating a Vehicle While Under the Influence of 
Liquor ("OUIL") and a companion per se violation of operating a ve-
hicle with a blood-alcohol level in excess of0.10%. When the students 
presented the case to me after the intake interview, they reported that 
the client admitted that he was guilty. They therefore assumed that 
the representation would involve routine plea bargaining with most of 
our energy focused on sentencing and obtaining a restricted driver's 
license. 
The representation had an unusual complicating factor: the cli-
ent's native language was Spanish and his ability to speak English was 
limited. Accordingly, we had arranged for a law student fluent in 
Spanish to attend the intake interview as a translator. As we reviewed 
the video tape, I noted that when the students asked the client, "What 
happened?" his first response was "Yo soy culpable. " The translator 
paused for a moment and then said, for the client, "I'm guilty."20 The 
students confirmed that this exchange was the basis for their report 
that the client "admitted" he was guilty. 
I was curious to find out why the client's words were translated as 
"I'm guilty," and so I sought out the translating law student. The 
translator confirmed my suspicion that the Spanish word used by our 
client, "culpable," was a close cognate of the English word bearing the 
same form. As a result, the client's statement could have also been 
translated: "I am culpable" or "I am blameworthy." Thus the client 
could have been saying something more like, "I feel bad about what I 
did," or "I accept personal responsibility for the consequences of my 
action." If the client's words had been given these latter possible 
translations, the students might well have reached a different conclu-
sion about his admission of "guilt." 
I first met our client myself a few days later when we went to court 
for his arraignment. The court file did not contain the police report or 
the results of the breathalyzer test our client told us he was given at 
the police station. The test results were important because different 
20. Here, and throughout the remainder of this article, citations to the actual case file, plead-
ings, and other documents are omitted. I do this both because the relevant materials are, as a 
result of the attorney-client privilege, inaccessible for independent verification; and, further, be-
cause I believe that the formalities oflaw review citations to the facts cited in these tales would be 
inconsistent with the narrative style of the tales. 
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levels of blood alcohol bring into play both different statutory pre-
sumptions and different plea bargaining positions under the operating 
policies of the local prosecutor's office. We were also eager to see 
whether the police report corroborated our client's story that the test 
was administered despite his indicating to the police that he did not 
speak English. Because administration of the breathalyzer test re-
quires consent, the police must read a Miranda-type stat~ment of 
"chemical test rights" before giving the test. We thought there might 
be a good argument for suppressing the test results on the theory that 
our client did not give an informed consent. 
We decided that our lack of necessary information made plea ne-
gotiations at the arraignment unwise. We therefore told our client, 
through the law student interpreter, that we recommended a plea of 
"not guilty." Our client said he did not understand and insisted that 
he was "guilty." At that point our case was called and we advised our 
client to "stand mute," which he did. When we told the judge that our 
client was "standing mute," he entered a plea of not guilty "on behalf 
of" the defendant, as is customary. It is because our client was thus 
"struck mute" in court that I call this the "Case of the Silenced 
Client." 
Even though the client was silent, the judge, in effect, put words 
into his mouth: according to the record, he "pied" not guilty. The 
court (with our tacit connivance) "made up" a defendant who took the 
proper adversarial position so that the case could proceed. In this 
sense, the defendant who "appeared" in court was indeed only a "rep-
resentation," an image projected by the institutional needs of the judge 
and lawyers. 
I was intrigued and troubled by the gap between ourselves and our 
client over the word "guilty." On what authority, with what justifica-
tions, could we proceed to "represent" him if we did not understand 
what he meant by "culpable" and he did not understand what we 
meant by "not guilty"? It was while this experience was fresh in my 
mind that the next story took place. 
Ill. RE-PRESENTING A CLIENT: THE CASE OF THE SILENCED 
LAWYER 
One day a local federal magistrate called our clinic to ask whether 
we would represent a prisoner who had a civil rights case ready to go 
to trial. The prisoner had litigated this federal lawsuit himself for sev-
eral years, surviving two summary judgment motions brought by the 
defending prison officials. Early in the litigation he had filed a motion 
for appointment of counsel, but later fired the appointed counsel for 
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reasons not entirely clear from the record. On the day of trial, the 
judge had concluded the prisoner needed the assistance of counsel, ad-
journed the case, and asked the magistrate to contact us. 
We accepted the appointment only after receiving and reviewing 
the extensive record, which included the transcript of an evidentiary 
hearing and several opinions on the summary judgment motions. 
Upon acceptance, we filed an appearance before meeting with our pro-
spective client, contrary to our usual practice. Communication with 
the prisoner was difficult because he had been placed in solitary con-
finement in a high-security prison. 
By the time we filed our appearance, a deadline was fast approach-
ing for a hearing on the defendants' third motion for summary judg-
ment. I discussed with the team of students whether we should try to 
meet with our client before filing a supplemental brief on the motion. 
The students understandably felt that filing the brief was the more ur-
gent task and plausibly suggested that our first meeting with the client 
might go better if we had the finished brief to show him. 
Our plan of action seemed for a time to work well. When the stu-
dents met with the client for the first time, they gave him a copy of the 
brief and he seemed pleased with them and their work. However, at 
the next meeting, in court for the summary judgment hearing, the cli-
ent showed the students a page in the brief where he had written 
"Wrong!" in the margin next to a sentence that stated: "Plaintiff's 
claim is that he was placed in segregation and deprived of good-time 
credits based on false misconduct reports and hearings of which he 
received no notice and was not permitted to attend." Several days 
after the hearing, our client mailed to the court a handwritten motion 
invoking the right of self-representation and asking the court to termi-
nate our appointment to represent him. The stated ground for the 
motion was that "false/wrong claim and/or statement of fact has been 
advanced/made" by the appointed counsel, specifically citing the one 
sentence in the brief. 
Because of the timing of our entry into the case, in preparing the 
brief and our trial strategy we had relied largely on the court's previ-
ous opinions as defining the factual and legal issues. "The case" as we 
thus understood it centered on our client's claim that several prison 
disciplinary hearings had been conducted in his absence. The key fac-
tual dispute was whether he had received notice of these hearings and 
refused to attend, as the prison officials claimed, or whether, as he 
contended, he learned of the hearings only afterwards when discipline 
was imposed. The sentence our client had marked as "wrong" in the 
brief reflected this understanding of "the case." I have placed "the 
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case" in quotation marks because, as we soon learned, "the case" that 
our client had in mind was different from "the case" we learned about 
by reading the court's opinions. 
Of course, when we received the motion, the students and I went 
back out to the prison. Because another faculty member had super-
vised the summary judgment hearing, it was my first face-to-face en-
counter with our client. 
We met in a kind of cage between the prison control center and the 
solitary confinement wing. The only chairs were welded together in a 
straight line, so I ended up squatting against the wall in order to look 
at my client while we spoke. Without the security of a desk and 
armchair, I felt somewhat naked and no doubt looked a bit foolish. It 
was, in retrospect, perhaps an appropriate posture for an unusual 
interview. 
I found myself looking slightly upwards into the eyes of a very 
intense and determined man. He began by insisting that there was no 
need for a trial because there were "no factual issues." He kept saying 
that the defendant officials had "violated the eighth and fourteenth 
amendments" by disciplining him without legal authority. As we 
talked it became. increasingly clear to me that he viewed "his case" not 
as a complaint about lack of notice but as an assertion that the entire 
prison disciplinary system was illegal. His central point seemed to be 
that the disciplinary system was not authorized by specific state stat-
utes and regulations but was only based on administratively adopted 
policy statements and operating procedures. Although he agreed that 
he had said in his complaint (and still insisted) that he had received no 
notice of the hearings, he saw no need for a trial on that disputed fact 
issue in light of his more systemic attack on the legitimacy of the 
prison's entire disciplinary system. 
We tried to accommodate his vision of the case with our trial strat-
egy by suggesting that ours was simply an alternate theory of liability: 
even if the court would not accept his sweeping attack on the system, 
he might still prevail by showing that the defendants had failed to 
follow due process in his particular case by not notifying him of the 
hearings and by conducting them in his absence. He would have none 
of it. He did not want us to assert our theory of "the case" precisely 
because that theory was not his case, even though the events described 
in his pro se complaint gave rise to the claim both we and the court 
had assumed he was making. 
My interview ended on a somber note. I asked the prisoner what 
he wanted us to do at this point. His terse reply: "Don't show up in 
court." 
2468 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:2459 
We did show up in court because the judge asked us to withdraw 
formally on the record, on the morning of trial. Our client reaffirmed 
in open court his desire to represent himself, but before the judge 
granted his request the judge attempted to review with our client what 
the issues would be for trial. He was surprised to hear our client assert 
that -there was no need for trial but, despite admirable patience, the 
judge was unable to get our client to explain clearly the position dis-
closed in our interview with him. 
At that point I felt placed in a very peculiar position. My client 
had told me in no uncertain terms that he did not want me to repre-
sent him, yet I felt a desire to help him make himself clear to the 
judge. But without a client to "speak for," it was I who "stood mute" 
in the courtroom. I realized that without a client I had no identity in 
that court, in that case. Nonetheless, I decided to speak. 
I rose to my feet, but first addressed not the court but my erstwhile 
client. Turning to him, I explained how I felt, that I knew he did not 
want me to "speak for him" yet I thought it would help if I shared 
with the judge my understanding of what he had said in our interview. 
I told him to feel free to stop me at any point and asked him to listen 
carefully so that he could correct anything I said when I was done. I 
then faced the judge and stated my understanding of how my client's 
idea of his claim differed from the claim described in the court's earlier 
opinions and our brief, carefully choosing my words in an effort to 
make sure that my client could understand everything I said. It was a 
challenging experience, this effort to speak to the court in my client's 
voice rather than my own. At the conclusion, I turned to my client 
and asked him if what I had said was a fair statement of his claim. He 
looked slightly surprised but pleased and said, "yes, that's about 
right." 
The judge then granted the request for self-representation and the 
student attorneys and I left. 
By silencing his lawyers, our former client gained the right to 
speak for himself in court but, ultimately, he still did not feel he was 
heard. I am told that after we left the judge continued the dialogue 
with the plaintiff and eventually allowed him to proceed on his claim 
that the disciplinary policies were without legal authority.21 Although 
the trial resulted in a judgment for the defendants, the judge did not 
treat the claim of systemic illegality as frivolous. In fact, the court 
21. In the court's Memorandum Opinion and Order following the trial, the judge noted that 
the plaintiff"only clearly defined his claims when the trial began." Although this Memorandum 
Opinion and Order is a public record, I have omitted full citation to the case because that would 
reveal the identity of the client and thus potentially violate the attorney-client privilege. 
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noted that the challenged prison disciplinary policy had been invali-
dated by the state supreme court three years earlier22 because it had 
not been promulgated through formal rulemaking in accordance with 
the state's Administrative Procedures Act. 23 Unfortunately for the 
plaintiff, the state supreme court's declaration of invalidity was not 
given retroactive effect24 and plaintiff's claim related to discipline im-
posed before the state supreme court decision. 
The plaintiff filed a motion for new trial. The "Argument" section 
of his brief stated: "The court has misconstru( ed)cted [sic] the facts in 
[the] complaint and the claims presented by plaintiff and too plainly 
failed to adjudicate same." Later in the brief he asserted: "For 
whatever reasons the [c]ourt obviously fail[ed]/refused to recognize 
the 8th and 14th Amend[ment] claims clearly stated in [the] com-
plaint, [and] reiterated throughout Plaintiff{'s] pleadings ... and again 
in open court immediately after appointed counsel was dismissed for 
misrepresentation of Plaintiff's claims .... " The judge responded by 
denying the motion, saying that he had "addressed the claims [plain-
tiff] stated at trial he wished to present." 
Why did the prisoner doggedly insist even after my "re-presenta-
tion" and the trial that his claims were never heard? Did he simply 
fail to understand that the judge did hear his claims but rejected them? 
Or did both the judge and I still fail to understand what he was claim-
ing? Whatever the reason, as at the conclusion of the first tale, a seem-
ingly unbridgeable gap seemed to separate the judge and lawyers on 
one side and the client on the other. 
IV. MIND THE GAP 
A. Living in Two Worlds 
The events described in these two tales occurred within the same 
thirty-day period at the beginning of 1989, the same thirty-day period 
during which I wrote the first draft of this article. The theoretical 
section of this article which follows was largely composed in the hours 
around dawn during that month. Indeed, parts were probably written 
on some of the same days that I consulted with students, met with 
clients, and went to court on these two cases. At the time, my life 
seemed split between two utterly different worlds: one silent, solitary, 
bounded by a sphere of lamplight with the world beyond barely visible 
in hushed shades of gray, and the other so hectic, so full of sound and 
22. Martin v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 424 Mich. 553, 384 N.W. 2d 392 (1986). 
23. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 24.201-.315 (1979). 
24. Martin v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 168 Mich. App. 647, 425 N.W. 2d 205 (1988). 
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glare as to make my monastic contemplations of a few hours earlier 
fade like a dream. This article is quite literally my effort to connect 
these worlds: to make my contemplative life relevant to my life as a 
lawyer and to make my lawyering meaningful. My story of writing 
this article - in which my written words shuttled back and forth in 
my mind to weave a relationship between my hours of contemplation 
and action - could be seen as a metaphor for the theory described 
below of the dynamic relation between experience and knowledge, in 
which language plays a central role. Or perhaps the theoretical model 
set forth below is a metaphor for my life during those thirty days, 
attractive to me because it offers a way to unite those divided selves. 
I 
I did not at first see a connection between these cases and my early 
morning writing. Indeed, as I write this sentence several months and 
several drafts later, I still do not fully understand the relation between 
these cases and this article. As a storyteller, I am uncomfortable with 
the titles I have chosen for these tales and with the epilogues that ap-
pear at the end of each, uncomfortable because the titles and epilogues 
seem to reduce the significance of the stories by purporting to say 
"what they mean." The titles and epilogues treat these tales as if they 
were simple sketches to illustrate the conceptual discussions which 
precede and follow them. But these are true stories, and thus have 
greater vitality and richness than my efforts to categorize and charac-
terize the persons and events I experienced. 
B. Redefining Reality 
The titles and epilogues to these two tales represent my retrospec-
tive interpretation of the events in the two cases. At the time, during 
the thirty-day period, I was primarily aware simply of the gap be-
tween lawyer and client and, as a result, between court and client. The 
traveler on the London subway, the "Tube" or "Underground," hears 
a warning whenever a train pulls into a stop: "MIND THE GAP," 
intones a forbidding, mechanical voice. The warning causes the trav-
eler to notice that the platform and threshold of the train car are not a 
continuous surface, that a narrow but potentially perilous gap sepa-
rates the two. The tales of the mute client and the silenced lawyer 
served for me as such a warning; like the busy and preoccupied Tube 
traveler, I needed to be reminded that a deep gap can sever client from 
lawyer. 
This kind of gap seems a common feature of lawyer- client relation-
ships. Austin Sarat and William Felstiner are in the process of pub-
lishing the results of a monumental study of lawyer-client 
conversations. Their data consist of 115 tape-recorded conversations 
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taken from forty divorce cases observed over thirty-three months, in 
two sites from different states.25 Their detailed study of these conver-
sations shows a consistent pattern: 
Clients focus their interpretive energy in efforts to construct an explana-
tion of the past and of their marriage's failure. Lawyers avoid respond-
ing to these interpretations because they do not consider that who did 
what to whom in the marriage is relevant to the legal task of dissolving 
it. In this domain clients largely talk past their lawyers, and interpretive 
activity proceeds without the generation and ratification of a shared un-
derstanding of reality.26 
Indeed Sarat and Felstiner go so far as to suggest that the lawyers and 
clients seem to be dealing with two different divorces. 27 
Although I was not familiar with Sarat and Felstiner's study at the 
time of the two cases, almost the same point had come to mind when a 
sentence surfaced in my mind from the depths of my memory: "We 
don't care about what happened; we only care about what is going to 
happen." This sentence seemed to describe the arraignment in the 
Case of the Silenced Client: although the plea appeared to be a state-
ment about what had happened (whether our client had committed a 
crime), as lawyers we only seemed to care about what was going to 
happen as a result of the plea. "Not guilty" was not a faithful descrip-
tion of our client's culpability, but rather only a rhetorical move in a 
verbal game in which the client was silent and largely powerless. 
I recalled the sentence as the title of an article I had assigned for 
reading several years earlier to a class in legal ethics.28 I then reread 
the article, which was based on a nine-month study by social scientist 
Carl Hosticka of lawyer-client interactions in two different law offices. 
The title was a direct quote from a conversation between Hosticka and 
one of the attorneys studied. 29 Hosticka concluded that the lawyers 
25. Sarat & Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW & SocY. 
REV. 93 (1986). 
26. Sarat & Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client 
Interaction, 22 LAW & SocY. REV. 737, 742 (1988) (footnote omitted). 
27. Sarat and Felstiner make this suggestion by quoting a study by John Griffiths of Dutch 
divorce lawyers in which Griffiths observed: 
[L]awyers and clients are in effect largely occupied with two different divorces: lawyers with 
a legal divorce, clients with a social and emotional divorce. The lawyers orient themselves 
toward legal norms and institutional practices, the clients toward the social norms of their 
environment. Clients go to lawyers because it is otherwise impossible to secure a divorce, 
not because they want to invoke the legal system as a regulatory and conflict-resolving 
institution. 
Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 26, at 764 (quoting Griffiths, What Do Dutch Lawyers Actually Do 
in Divorce Cases, 20 LAW & SocY. REV. 135, 155 (1986)). 
28. Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About What Is Going to 
Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 SOCIAL PROBS. 599 (1979). 
29. Id. at 608. 
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studied often redefined "what happened" to their clients in order to 
change "what is going to happen": 
"[W]hat happened" is not immutably fixed in an objective reality, but is 
a social construction based on experience and interaction. . . . [T]he 
primary issue may not be what happened to the client, nor what kind of 
trouble the client is in, but who has the power to say what happened and 
to define the kind of trouble. Indeed the power to define the client's 
problem is one tool professionals may use to induce client cooperation 
with their prescription of appropriate behavior .... 
This control over the interaction is reflected in the official definition 
of reality that results from the interaction. . . . [P]ower is exercised 
through the definition of reality .... 30 
I found myself uncomfortable with Hosticka's assumption that 
lawyers are autonomous creators of meaning, not bound in any way to 
the client's account of "what happened." Nonetheless, both of my 
cases seemed to authenticate Hosticka's view: in the Case of the Si-
lenced Client, by instructing our client to stand mute knowing that a 
not guilty plea would be entered, we "re-defined" our client's reality, 
to' control what was going to happen; in the Case of the Silenced Law-
yer, the client realized that the only way he could regain control over 
"his case" was to deprive his lawyers of the power to define "what 
happened." 
I found myself focusing on Hosticka's initial premise: that "what 
happened" is not "fixed in an objective reality" but is rather "a social 
construction." The subtitle of his article, "Lawyer-Client Negotia-
tions of Reality," is based upon this premise. The assertion that "real-
ity" is socially constructed, negotiable, although familiar in the 
academic world,3 I would be startling to many of our clients. Indeed, 
the gap in both tales seems related to this point. The silenced client 
stood mute because in his view he was "really" guilty and it would be 
a lie to plead not guilty. My other client silenced me, claiming I had 
literally misrepresented his case. By constructing a different legal 
claim than his out of the same facts, I made a "false" statement.32 
30. Id. at 599-600 (citations omitted). 
31. Hosticka, in using the phrase, refers to P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CON· 
STRUCTION OF REALITY (1966). Sarat and Felstiner use similar terminology. See Sarat & Fel-
stiner, supra note 25, at 116-25 (referring to the "legal construction of the client"); Sarat & 
Felstiner, supra note 26, at 738 ("the idea of negotiating reality"). A similar assumption under-
lies some other contributions to this symposium. See, e.g .. Delgado, Storytelling for Opposition· 
ists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2415 (1989); Williams, The 
Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128, 2131· 
32, 2151 (1989); cf. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and 
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2229 (1989) (rejecting the view that meaning is 
simply social convention or results from unconstrained subjectivity). 
32. Actually, the way that my prisoner-client wrote his own pleadings, although probably 
attributable to a kind of jailhouse "lawyerese," suggested an intriguing ambiguity. He repeatedly 
August 1989] A Tale of Two Clients 2473 
Neither client seemed to think that "reality" was something that could 
be "negotiated" between him and his lawyer or with the court. 
"Something" really did happen and when their lawyer's story, told on 
their behalf to the court, failed to correspond to that reality, the law-
yer ceased to "represent" them. 
Yet the lawyer's work for a client cannot be limited to mere re-
presentation. New meaning is given to the "reality" the client brings 
to the lawyer and in some way that "reality" is altered. But how can 
the lawyer explain to the client, and to himself or herself, this process 
of creation and alteration without losing a sense that something really 
happened? How can the lawyer continue to care about what happened 
while creating what is going to happen? How can the lawyer tell a 
story that is nonetheless true? 33 
In trying to answer these questions I turned to thinking about the 
relationship between experience and knowledge and the relationship of 
language to both. 
V. THINKING ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPERIENCE 
AND KNOWLEDGE 
A. A Model of Mental Activity 
For many years, my ideas about the nature of language and its 
relation to mental activity have been influenced by the theories of a 
neo-Kantian philosopher, Ernst Cassirer, and of linguist Jerrold Katz. 
What follows should still be read as part of a story, not as assertive 
discourse claiming that their theories must be accepted by the legal 
community so as to mandate a rethinking of the nature of law and 
lawyering. Nor is it even necessary to assert that these theories are 
authoritative as a matter of philosophy or linguistics. 34 I ask the 
used an "and/or" construction which seemed to equivocate over the distinction between deliber-
ate falsity and mere error, and between fact and legal theory. In his motion for self-representa-
tion he asserted that the sentence in the brief was a "false/wrong claim and/or statement of 
fact." Did he mean by this construction that my statement of what his case "was about" was a 
false statement of fact or merely a mistaken interpretation of legal theory? Even more intriguing 
was his creative spelling of "misconstrued" in his motion for new trial: "the court has miscon-
tru(ed)cted the facts in complaint and the claims presented by plaintiff." "Misconstrued" sug-
gests simple misinterpretation of the facts and claims but his "alternate" word, "misconstructed" 
seems to accuse the court of changing, reconstructing, his facts and claims. 
33. Hosticka's view of reality seems to deny the possibility of telling "true stories." The very 
definition of "true" assumes that there is an objective reality "out there": "true: ... in accord-
ance with the actual state of affairs." WEBSTER'S, supra note l, at 952. But if "what happened" 
is mutable or negotiable, then "true story" collapses simply into "story" because there would be 
no "actual state of affairs" against which the story could be verified. 
34. For example, the cognitive theories described by linguist George Lakoff in G. LAKOFF, 
WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 
(1987), challenge and provide very interesting alternatives to the model discussed infra. See, e.g., 
id. at 205 (critiquing the use of "semantic markers" to represent meaning). 
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reader to judge this theoretical section, if at all, in the same way that 
any part of a story might be judged: is it understandable in its own 
terms, does it illuminate other parts of the story, and is it meaningful 
in terms of the reader's own experience?35 
From Cassirer I have learned about a model of mental activity di-
vided into three separate levels: sensation, experience, and knowledge. 
In this model, the level of sensation consists of the raw input from the 
external world, the complex pattern of nerve pulses from the sense 
organs. This is the lowest level of animate being; pure sensation can 
evoke an animate response but cannot be consciously experienced in 
that form. In order for sensation to rise to the level of experience it 
must be sorted and structured in relation to independent forms of intu-
ition. For example, the impulses from the optic nerve are sensation; 
visual perception is experience. We perceive an object as having a cer-
tain shape, size, and position, all in relation to an inherently assumed 
space. This space in turn possesses a coherent unity that cannot possi-
bly be the mere sum of the visual, motor, and tactile sensations 
presented at that particular instant. 36 
Instead of a sharp dichotomy between an external "real" world 
and an internal "subjective" world, this model postulates a dynamic 
relation. The internal world we experience is constituted out of sense 
data derived from the external world. A similar relation is proposed 
linking the levels of experience and knowledge. Knowledge is neither 
independent of nor simply dependent on experience; rather, the con-
ceptual world is constituted out of the elements of experience. 
In this model, language plays a central role in the constitution of 
knowledge out of experience. The very process of naming reduces the 
particularity of experience to reveal inherent factors of form and rela-
tion, then formalizes and stabilizes them. If we "call" something 
"blue," even in our mind, we select one element out of the complex of 
perceptual experience (focusing on hue rather than intensity or pat-
tern) and identify it as the same element experienced in relation to 
other objects. 37 
This model differs from both empiricism and idealism. It asserts 
that concepts are neither abstracted from empirical objects nor derived 
from transcendent ideals, but rather are realized in the process of ob-
35. One of the attractions of narrative as compared to traditional academic discourse is its 
noncoercive character; the narrator invites the reader to share and independently evaluate an 
experience instead of insisting that the reader agree with her assertions. See Delgado, supra note 
31, at 2415, 2434-35, 2439 n.83; White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature (Book Re· 
view), 102 HARV. L. REV. 2014, 2018 (1989). 
36. E. CASSIRER, I PHILOSOPHY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS 100-01 (R. Manheim trans. 1953). 
37. Id. at 281. 
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jectifying experience. By giving a name to experience, consciousness 
frees itself from passive captivity to sensation and experience and cre-
ates a world of its own, a world of representation. It is this world of 
representations that we "think" about and communicate to others. 
The world of representation, the realm of knowledge, is in dynamic 
relation with the world of experience. Initially, experience gives rise to 
the concepts which can be known and communicated. However, these 
forms of knowledge in turn may alter the way in which we experience, 
just as the forms of intuition structure our sensations. Under this 
model, "reality," as we know it, is neither simply "out there" nor 
merely a social construction. 38 
B. Seeing Through the Lens of Language 
A recent experiment by a team composed of linguist Paul Kay and 
anthropologist Willett Kempton vividly demonstrates how something 
as seemingly "real" as the perception of color can be affected by lan-
guage. 39 English has eleven basic40 color terms: black, white, red, yel-
38. My rather simple epistemological model resembles in many ways Steven Winter's exper-
ientialist approach, which I find very congenial. See Winter, supra note 31, at 2230-55; Winter, 
Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1105 (1989) [hereinafter Transcendental Nonsense]. Although Winter agrees that "acquisi-
tion of a particular language mediates further interactions with one's world," id. at 1141, his 
approach emphasizes, instead of language, the idea of "idealized cognitive models," which are 
often grounded in pre-linguistic bodily experiences, as the primary means of creating and or-
ganizing concepts, including legal concepts. Id. at 1152-59. 
39. See Kay & Kempton, What Is the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis?, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGJsr 
65 (1984) (discussed in G. LAKOFF, supra note 34, at 330-34). In relying on the Kay-Kempton 
experiment as an example of my model, I am departing from my practice of telling the story of , 
the writing of this article in the sequence in which the writing took place. Steven Winter intro-
duced me to this very interesting data both by sharing with me a draft of his article, Transcen-
dental Nonsense, supra note 38, at 1136-41, and by drawing my attention to the Kay-Kempton 
experiment during the first day of the symposium conference. In an earlier draft of this article 
prepared for the conference, I had used as my example at this point an account by anthropologist 
Godfrey Lienhardt about the Dinka, a cattle-herding people of the Sudan. According to 
Lienhardt, the Dinka have developed a highly elaborate vocabulary to describe the various color 
configurations found in the hides of the cattle around which their daily existence revolves. This 
vocabulary unifies pattern, color, and shade in a way very different from English. The Dinka 
then use the words that describe their cattle for other visual phenomena such as the appearance 
of the night sky. Lienhardt concludes: 
The Dinkas' very perception of colour, light, and shade in the world around them is in 
these ways inextricably connected with their recognition of colour-configurations in their 
cattle. If their cattle-colour vocabulary were taken away, they would have scarcely any way 
of describing visual experience in terms of colour, light and darkness. 
G. LJENHARDT, DIVINITY AND EXPERIENCE 12-13 (1961). Although Lienhardt's description 
also illustrates my model, the Kay-Kempton experiment makes use of more recent cognitive 
theory and has the virtue of experimental validation. 
40. Linguists define a basic color term as (1) consisting of only one morpheme ("green" vs. 
"dark green" or "grass-colored"), (2) referring to a color not contained within another color 
("red" vs. "scarlet"), (3) not restricted to a small number of objects ("brown" vs. "blond"), and 
(4) commonly and generally known ("yellow" vs. "saffron"). G. LAKOFF, supra note 34, at 25. 
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low, green, blue, brown, purple, pink, orange, and gray.41 
Surprisingly, some languages have as few as two basic color terms; for 
example, the Dani, a people of New Guinea, use the single word 
"mill" (which might be translated "dark-cool") to describe what we 
call black, green, and blue and, "mola" ("light-warm") to describe 
white, red, and yellow.42 The Kay-Kempton experiment focused on a 
language difference between English and Tarahumara, a language spo-
ken in northern Mexico. English speakers consistently identify objects 
radiating light waves at a wavelength of 485 nanometers as "focal 
blue" (that is, the best example of the color "blue") and objects at a 
wavelength of 510 nanometers as "focal green" (the best example of 
green). Tarahumara does not have two different basic color terms for 
blue and green; instead, the single word siyoname can be applied to 
objects at wavelengths of both 485 and 510 nanometers. 
The Kay-Kempton experiment was designed to test whether the 
fact that English and Tarahumara speakers talked about blue and 
green differently affected the way they thought about these colors. In 
the first part of the experiment, the subjects were shown different ar-
rays of three color chips and asked to point out which of the three 
chips was most different in color from the other two. For example, the 
subjects were shown chips A, B, and C. A was closer to the focal green 
wavelength, C was closer to the focal blue wavelength, and B was in 
between A and C in terms of wavelength. When measured by the way 
the human eye senses wavelength differences, there was a greater color 
difference between A and B than between B and C. However, both A 
and B fell within the range of wavelengths that English speakers call 
"green" while C fell within the wavelength range for "blue.'' The 
chart below illustrates this relationship, taking the wavelength color 
distance between B and C as the standard measure = 1.00. 
GREEN BLUE 
A <--------------> B 
1.27 1.00 
The Tarahumara speakers "correctly" identified A as the most differ-
ent while the English speakers identified C as the most different. Tests 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 40. 
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with other arrays verified that the English speakers consistently identi-
fied a chip as more "different" if it had a different basic color name in 
English even though it was actually closer in wavelength characteris-
tics to the intermediate chip than was the third chip. 43 
The design of the Kay-Kempton experiment ruled out the possibil-
ity that the actual vision - at the sensation level - of the English-
speaking subjects was distorted.44 Kay and Kempton therefore hy-
pothesized that the English speakers were using what they called "the 
name strategy." Faced with a difficult judgment to make among ob-
jects with subtle hue differentiations, the English speakers resorted to 
the difference in basic color name.45 The Tarahumara speakers did 
not have this "name strategy" available to them because all three chips 
would be given the same basic color name in their language; hence, 
their judgments of color differences were not skewed. 
Kay and Kempton found an interesting response when they dis-
cussed the name strategy explanation with their English-speaking 
subjects: 
When we present the crucial triples of colors to sophisticated English-
speaking subjects, describe the name strategy to them, and ask them to 
suppress any tendency to use this strategy, they make the same subjec-
43. Two other test arrays can be represented using the same chart format: 
GREEN BLUE 
E <----------> F <-------> 
1.27 1.14 
B <------> C <------> D 
1.00 1.00 
In the E-F-G array, the English speakers identified G as most different while the Tarahumara 
speakers "correctly" identified E as the chip most different from the other two. In the B-C-D 
array, the B-C and C-D distances were the same in wavelength characteristics, yet English speak-
ers identified B as much more different. (Tarahumara speakers identified B as slightly more 
different; see Kay & Kempton, supra note 39, at 71 for an explanation of this result.) 
44. Id. at 72. 
45. Kay and Kempton portray this strategy as an internal conversation: "It's hard to decide 
here which one looks the most different. Are there any other kinds of clues I might use? Aha! A 
and B are both CALLED green while C is CALLED blue. That solves my problem; I'll pick C 
as most different." Id. 
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tive judgments as naive subjects; further, they report that the chip se-
lected just "looks" the most different, regardless of the name. Thus, if 
the name strategy operates for English speakers, it operates at a level 
that is not only out of consciousness but cannot be easily brought under 
conscious control. 46 
Kay and Kempton did, however, develop a second test that seemed 
to verify the presence of something like their hypothesized name strat-
egy. In the first test, subjects had been shown all three color chips at 
the same time without any suggestion from the tester as to the color of 
any of them. The second test differed in two respects. First, the array 
was placed in a box with a sliding cover that allowed, for example, the 
A-B and B-C combinations to be observed in separate compartments 
simultaneously while preventing a directA-C comparison. Second, the 
tester engaged the English-speaking subjects in the following conversa-
tion during the testing: 
Experimenter exposes pair {A,B). "You can see that this chip (points to 
A) is greener than this chip (points to B)." (All subjects readily agreed.) 
Experimenter then slides cover so that A is covered and C exposed along 
with B; that is, the pair (B, C) is now exposed. "You can see that this 
chip (points to C) is bluer than this chip (points to B)." (Again all sub-
jects agreed without problems.) "Now," experimenter hands stimuli to 
subject, "you may slide the cover back and forth as often as you like. I'd 
like you to tell me which is bigger: the difference in greenness between 
the two chips on the left or the difference in blueness between the two 
chips on the right."47 
In this test, the vast majority of the English-speaking subjects "cor-
rectly" identified the A-B difference as larger than the B-C difference, 
in contrast to the opposite result in the first test. The apparent expla-
nation is that because the dialogue with the tester had already estab-
lished in the subject's mind that chip B was both bluish and greenish, 
the subject was able to focus on the degree of difference with the 
greener chip, A, and the bluer chip, C: without being influenced by her 
linguistic "knowledge" that A and B were the "same" color. 
The Kay-Kempton experiment has been taken as important empir-
ical evidence to refute the common view that "language plays no cog-
nitive role other than to provide labels for concepts" and to show, "if 
only for one small case, that language is part of real cognition."48 For 
purposes of my story, it is not necessary to make this strong claim. 49 
46. Id. at 72-73. 
47. Id. at 73 (emphasis added). 
48. G. LAKOFF, supra note 34, at 333. 
49. For example, it is not entirely clear to me how Kay and Kempton were able to distin· 
guish the different mode ofviewing the three chips (all at once in test one and only inA-B or B-C 
pairs in test two) from the linguistic cuing to reach their conclusion that they had successfully 
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It is enough that the Kay-Kempton experiment provides a very clear 
and simple illustration of how language can shape the concepts we 
have about experience and thus actually affect what we know. 
The Kay-Kempton experiment also illustrates a key aspect of the 
Cassirerean model: that the constitution of knowledge out of experi-
ence (like the constitution of experience out of sensation) involves a 
selection and reduction process. Not all elements can be retained 
when a given content of experience is conceptualized. Thus the Eng-
lish speakers "lost" some of their perception of hue difference between 
color chips A and B when they "named" them both "green." The 
mind must develop a symbolic form to represent the objectified experi-
ence which can be retained in consciousness and applied to the next 
experience. Just as we cannot experience sensory input without first 
constituting it by use of the forms of intuition, we cannot know experi-
ence except by constituting it through use of symbolic forms of repre-
sentation. The English speakers "knew" more about the difference 
between focal green and focal blue than the Tarahumara speakers be-
cause they could use two distinct basic color terms to think about the 
difference. Yet this greater conceptual sophistication blinded them to 
subtleties of perception that their vocabulary could not encompass. 
The price we pay for entering the realm of knowledge is that we must 
leave behind the rich particularity of experience. 50 
C. Constituting Meaning Through Language 
I found Cassirer's model of mental activity helpful in thinking 
about the semantic theory of Jerrold Katz.51 In this theory, semantic 
analysis of meaning begins with the sense of a word consisting of a set 
of semantic markers which represent constituent concepts; this set is 
called the reading. 
For example, a partial reading of the word "chair" could be repre-
sented as follows, where each pair of parentheses contains a semantic 
marker: 
shown the influence of the "name strategy." However, because I am using their experiment only 
for illustrative value, I have not attempted to resolve this doubt. 
50. See E. CASSIRER, supra note 36, at 108. ("Measured by the limitless richness and diver-
sity of intuitive reality, all linguistic symbols would inevitably seem empty; measured by its indi-
vidual concretion, they would inevitably seem abstract and vague. If language attempts to 
compete with sensation or intuition in this respect, it cannot but fall far behind."); see also id. at 
113 ("[T]he richer the symbolic content of cognition ... becomes, the more its essential content 
must diminish.") 
51. For a more complete account of this semantic theory and an application of semantic 
analysis to a complex problem of legal interpretation, see Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of 
the Meanings of ''Search" in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 Iowa L. 
Rev. 541 (1988). 
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(Object), (Physical), (Non-living), (Artifact), (Furniture), (Portable), 
(Something with legs), (Something with a back), (Something with a seat), 
(Seat for one)s2 
The reading of a word also contains, in addition to semantic mark-
ers, features called selection restrictions that specify the conditions 
under which a word can be combined with other words to form a de-
rived reading, the complete sense of a syntactically complex expression 
like a sentence. For example, the verb "yawn" contains in its reading 
the selection restriction <X is animate> s3 where 'X" represents the 
subject of the verb. This selection restriction prevents "chair" and 
"yawn" from combining to form a derived reading because "chair" 
does not contain the marker (animate). As a result, the expression 
"The chair yawned" is readily identified by a native speaker of English 
as "sounding wrong." By contrast, the expression "Throw me that 
chair" "sounds right" in part because "chair" does contain the seman-
tic marker (object) which is required for combination with the verb 
"throw." 
Selection restrictions do not merely block the formation of derived 
readings. They also can contribute to the meaning of an expression. 
For example, selection restrictions can clarify the meaning of an am-
biguous s4 word, such as "school." In the expression "There is no 
school now," the hearer does not know whether a physical structure 
has disappeared or whether an educational program is simply not in 
session. However, the expression "The school burned down" does not 
suffer from such an ambiguity because a selection restriction in the 
verb "burn" selects "physical structure" and rejects "educational pro-
gram," thus supplying an element of meaning absent in the first, am-
biguous expression. 
Selection restrictions can also confer meaning on vague ss words, 
such as "thing." In the expression "I do not like that thing," the 
hearer cannot tell from the expression alone whether or not "thing" is 
a physical object. But in the expression "Throw me that thing," the 
hearer does know that "thing" is a physical object because the selec-
52. J. KATZ, SEMANTIC THEORY 40 (1972). 
53. Parentheses - ( ) - identify semantic markers; angled brackets - < > - are used to 
identify selection restrictions. 
54. In this semantic theory, ambiguity is defined as the presence of at least two distinct read-
ings for the same word or expression. Id. at 49; see also J. HURFORD & B. HEASLEY, SEMAN· 
TICS: A COURSEBOOK 121 (1983). 
55. A vague word or expression differs from an ambiguous one because the difficulty in un· 
derstanding its meaning results from the absence of necessary semantic information in its reading 
rather than the problem of choosing between multiple possible readings. See G. DILLON, INTRO· 
DUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS 123 (1977) (distinguishing vagueness 
from ambiguity). 
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tion restriction in the reading of "throw" imposes that semantic fea-
ture on "thing." 
This semantic theory provides a way of describing how the form of 
language can constitute concepts out of experience. 
Let us assume that a person who has never seen or heard of a chair 
is presented with a chair by a native speaker of English. She has a 
perceptual experience in which her various sense impressions are or-
ganized by the basic forms of intuition. Her resulting perception may 
be similar to that of the native speaker, but her knowledge is different. 
Unlike the native speaker, she does not know that she is seeing a chair. 
Even if she asks the native speaker, "What is this?", and is told that 
"This is a chair," she still lacks complete knowledge about the concept 
represented by the verbal symbol, "chair." This single experiential 
referent can only be the beginning of her knowledge of the meaning of 
"chair." Not only is she unable to distinguish a chair from a bench, 
couch, or stool, but more fundamentally she cannot know at what 
level of generality the word "chair" is tied to the experiential referent. 
How is she to know that "chair" is more specific than "object," "arti-
fact," or "furniture"? In all likelihood, she will come to know what 
"chair" means by hearing and speaking the word in a variety of con-
texts. Her experience is constituted into knowledge by the operation 
of the form of language, most importantly the interaction of semantic 
markers and selection restrictions. 
Each time selection restrictions block or create a derived reading, a 
complex interlocking of conceptual constructs56 is generated. Just as 
selection restrictions can project meaning on a vague word like 
"thing," they will make an unfamiliar word (such as "chair" to our 
hypothetical inquirer) increasingly meaningful as it is used in varying 
contexts. Obviously, one must first have some semantic competence in 
the language being used for selection restrictions to function, but each 
use builds this general competence as well as knowledge of the concep-
tual structure of individual words. 
It seemed to me that this semantic theory integrates well with Cas-
sirer's model of the relation between experience and knowledge. 57 Se-
56. Each word used as a semantic marker could itself be given a reading that discloses fur-
ther component concepts. Katz suggests an analysis of "Object" in almost Kantian terms: "an 
organization of parts that are spatio-temporally contiguous which form a stable whole having an 
orientation in space." J. KATZ, supra note 52, at 40. 
57. Katz is a rationalist; he believes that the basic concepts which are the foundation for the 
markers are innate within the mind and simply awakened by the stimulus of sense experience. 
See J. KATZ, supra note 52, at 12-18; J. KATZ, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 240-82 (1966). 
However, the process by which Katz tests the proposed reading is by using the word in a variety 
of contexts. By placing "chair" with a verb that requires an animate subject he verifies that one 
feature of "chair" is non-living. This process, because it can be verified against any sample of 
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lection restrictions both impose a conceptual structure on 
undifferentiated experience and reduce that experience by eliminating 
some aspects of the experience in order to constitute other aspects into 
a meaning. The process of learning the meaning of "chair" requires 
both the organization of perceptual experience according to highly ab-
stract conceptual principles, such as whether the experiential referent 
is animate or an artifact, and the elimination of such parts of the expe-
rience as the color and texture of the perceived object, which are not 
among the semantic markers of "chair." 
One significant result of the process of constituting meaning out of 
experience through the semantic form of language is that the sense of a 
word is necessarily less rich than its underlying experiential referents. 
Even the most complete reading for "chair" could not fully replicate 
any given experience of perceiving a chair. Just as a person who has 
seen a chair may not know what a "chair" is, a person who knows the 
meaning of "chair" has not thereby experienced the perception of a 
chair. 
VI. LAW AS LANGUAGE, LAWYERING AS TRANSLATION 
A. Thinking About Translation 
This model, this way of talking about the relation between experi-
ence and knowledge, helped me to think about the representation of a 
client as a series of dialogues: both between the client and lawyer and 
between the lawyer and other legal actors such as opposing lawyers 
and a judge. Each dialogue replicates the internal mental dynamic 
between experience and knowledge in which language both constitutes 
concepts out of experience and reconstitutes experience by use of con-
cepts. Thus, when a client and lawyer talk about "what happened," 
the client's initial knowledge of her own experience is shaped by the 
vocabulary she uses to express it. In trying to communicate her expe-
rience to her lawyer, the client typically is struggling herself to organ-
ize, structure, and relate that experience to other experiences she has 
known and thereby to understand herself what happened. Her inabil-
ity to speak the language of the law prevents her from knowing her 
experience as a legal event. This desire for knowledge is often ex-
pressed in the question, "Do I have a case?" As the lawyer attempts 
to "make a case" out of the client's lay narrative, there is indeed a 
transformation of "reality," but only at one level, the level of knowl-
edge. The lawyer cannot change the client's raw memories of the ex-
native speakers, provides an empirical base to his analysis. But from a Cassirerean perspective, 
the "testing" process can also be seen as the epistemological origin of the concept. 
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perience but can and indeed must alter the client's knowledge of 
"what happened" by reconstituting that experience into a different 
symbolic form. 
If law is seen as a language, then the lawyer becomes a translator. 
Unlike "re-presentation" and "creating a representation," the idea of 
translation captures that elusive sense of two persons speaking with 
one voice. If language is intimately bound up with the way we think 
about experience, then talking about experience in a different language 
necessarily entails knowing that experience in a somewhat different 
way. Thus the translator must give new meaning in the process of 
translation, yet at the same time the translator strives to speak, not as 
herself, but as another. The translator is faced with the same kind of 
gap as the lawyer, a gap marked by language. 
This idea of lawyering as translation developed out of a mix of 
experiences during that thirty-day period split between early morning 
philosophical musings and daytime lawyering. At the time I was read-
ing a draft of the concluding chapter of James Boyd White's forthcom-
ing book, Justice As Translation, 58 in which he suggested that the 
activity of translation is at the center oflaw.59 I was suddenly struck 
by the way that the "Case of the Silenced Client" functioned as a pow-
erful image of lawyering as translation. It occurred to me that the 
English-Spanish language barrier only highlighted a gap that would 
have existed even if our client spoke English. Just as we were not sure 
what our client meant when he said he was "culpable," he did not 
understand what we meant when we said he was "not guilty." In or-
der to understand what we meant by "not guilty," the client would 
need at a minimum to know about the presumption of innocence, the 
procedural role of arraignment, the elements of the two different crim-
inal charges against him, the possibility of suppressing key evidence, 
and the effect of such suppression on the state's ability to carry its 
58. J.B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION (forthcoming). 
59. This thesis is most thoroughly developed in the final chapter of White's yet-to-be pub-
lished book. Id. However, the metaphor of translation pervades White's earlier work. See, e.g., 
J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: EssAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 36 
(1985); White, Thinking About Our Language, 96 YALE L.J. 1960, 1979-83 (1987). Although my 
thinking about the law and lawyering has been significantly influenced by J.B. White, since my 
first year of law school when I wrote a paper entitled "The Language of Law" for a memorable 
seminar he taught, his views oflaw as language and lawyering as translation have rather different 
epistemological foundations than do mine. As discussed at length in his forthcoming book, 
White sees translation as, in an important sense, impossible. The translator thus must become a 
kind of poet, creating a new text in a second language, in response to the text in the first. He and 
I both agree that translators have a duty of fidelity to the original text, as lawyers have to their 
clients. However, for him there is no language-free reality and he resists a dichotomy of "con-
cepts" and "experience." See id. at 1965-73. Therefore, he would evaluate a translation, like a 
representation, as to whether it "does justice" to the original, relying on moral and aesthetic 
values, whereas I would emphasize the constraints of experience, concepts, and language. 
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burden of proof. In many ways, when the lawyer says "not guilty," 
the lawyer is translating from ordinary English as much as our inter-
preter interpreted our client's Spanish "culpable" as "guilty" in 
English. 
While the Case of the Silenced Client made me realize how mean-
ing can be lost in translation, another experience during those thirty 
days revealed how meaning is also created by translation. I happened 
to see the English-subtitled version of an outstanding Indian film, Sa-
laam Bombay, which tells the story of a kind of modern-day Oliver 
Twist surviving on the streets of Bombay. One scene shows an older 
boy fleecing an American tourist by selling some adulterated cocaine. 
As the seller recounts his successful scam to the admiring protagonist, 
he refers to the tourist scornfully as a "ferenghi," which the subtitle 
translates as "white boy." Thanks to several stays in India, I knew 
enough Hindi to be somewhat startled by this translation. "Ferenghi" 
is translated in the standard dictionary as "foreigner." But as I 
thought about the history and usage of "ferenghi" and the context of 
the film, "white boy" seemed a better translation. "Ferenghi" was the 
word used by the Indians to refer to the English when India was a 
British colony. "White boy" therefore seemed better than "foreigner" 
to express the feelings of a formerly oppressed people toward a repre-
sentative example of their former oppressors. But as I thought even 
further, I realized how that translation had (literally) colored my im-
pressions of the film. The translated subtitle led me to look at the 
experiences of street urchins in Bombay as if they were black children 
in New York, thus imposing on a very different culture and social 
setting the unique relationship between black and white Americans. 
The subtitle writer for Salaam Bombay was forced to add and alter 
meaning because no English word means exactly what "ferenghi" 
means to an Indian. As a result, I saw a different movie than the 
original because the change in language changed the viewer's experi-
ence of the film, even though the "actual" sights and sounds remained 
unchanged. 
As I thought about how seeing this movie revealed to me the sub-
tlety and power of translation, I recalled that the textbook I used in 
the trial advocacy component of our clinical course suggests that a 
lawyer's presentation of a case in court be thought of as directing a 
film. 60 Like a director, the trial lawyer takes raw, unedited material 
and turns it into coherent and compelling narrative by organizing, ed-
iting, and focusing. This illustration, however, assumes that the trial 
60. T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTAL OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES § 4.2 (2d ed. 1988). 
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lawyer is not also writing the script, for of course under conventional 
mores of practice the lawyer who "puts words" in the mouths of his 
witnesses deserves blame, not praise. But, I thought after seeing Sa-
laam Bombay, what if we alter the metaphor and think of the lawyer 
as writing subtitles to a foreign film? 
Although the subtitle writer of Salaam Bombay was forced to 
change meaning, this translator no doubt felt constrained among the 
choices of English words to use. If indeed the more novel choice of 
"white boy" was a "better" translation than "foreigner," that wise 
choice was made possible only because the translator not only knew 
Hindi and English well, but also understood both Indian and Ameri-
can urban street culture, and further understood a great deal about the 
characters as they "lived" in the film. 
But how did the translator of Salaam Bombay come to understand 
both what "ferenghi" meant to the film characters and what "white 
boy" would mean to the American audience, and how could he or she 
"know" that the meaning created by the translation was a "fair repre-
sentation" of what was said in Hindi? These questions went to the 
center of my thinking and writing during the next several months. 
The metaphor of lawyering as translation seemed apt to me and to 
many who read the first two drafts of this article, but other readers did 
not find it helpful and almost all had difficulty understanding exactly 
how lawyering was like translation. This difficulty arose from my own 
problems articulating why the metaphor was apt. I finally decided 
that my idea of translation was too vague and abstract, which is not 
surprising since I have no personal experience as a translator. There-
fore, to try to come to know better what I meant by translation, I 
returned to a kind of experience. I made up the following two stories 
about translation using as raw material the experiments of Kay and 
Kempton. 
B. The Stories of Yolanda 
Imagine the following story. Yolanda has just returned to New 
York from a trip to northern Mexico, where she bought three different 
tiles, each identical except for differing shades of color, ranging from 
green to blue (corresponding to color chips A, B, and C in the Kay-
Kempton experiment). Her friend Jane greatly admires the tiles for 
their unusual colors and wants to order two dozen of one color for a 
house she is building. Yolanda offers to place a long-distance tele-
phone call to Maria, the person in Mexico who sold her the tiles. Yo-
landa is fluent in English and Tarahumara. Maria speaks only 
Tarahumara and Jane only English. 
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Yolanda: Maria, good morning. Do you remember the three tiles 
you sold me last week? 
Maria: Certainly, in fact I have my store samples of all three in 
front of me right now. 
Yolanda: Great. Well I am with a friend, Jane, who would like to 
order some of your tiles. 
Maria: Fine. Which types of the three tiles does she want and in 
what quantity? 
Yolanda: Jane, which types of the three tiles do you want and in 
what quantity? 
Jane: I want two dozen of the blue tile. 
Yolanda: Maria, she wants two dozen of the, uh, siyoname tile. 
Maria: Yolanda, that doesn't tell me anything. All three tiles are 
siyoname. 
Yolanda: Jane, she needs more information. She says that all 
three tiles are, well, the same color. 
Jane: That doesn't make any sense. Obviously one tile is blue and 
the other two are green. She must have a different set of tiles in front 
of her. 
Yolanda: Jane, no, she told me she has three samples in front of 
her which are the same as these tiles here. You need to know that in 
Tarahumara, the language Maria speaks, the same word - siyoname 
- is used for both blue and green. 
Jane: Well, that's just a semantic difference. She still must know 
that one tile is clearly a different color than the other two. 61 Ask her if 
she sees that two of the tiles are more similar in color. 
Yolanda: Maria, do you see that two of the tiles are more similar 
in color? 
Maria: Yes. 
Yolanda: Jane, she says yes. 
Jane: Well, then I want two dozen of the other tile. 
Yolanda: Maria, Jane wants two dozen of the other tile. 
Maria: Fine, I'll send them right away. 
If the behavior of Jane and Maria in this story conforms to that of 
the test subjects in the first Kay-Kempton experiment, then Maria will 
send to Jane two dozen tiles the color of chip A (the "greener" of the 
chips A and B) even though Jane thought she ordered tiles the color of 
chip C (the "blue" chip). Maria will have "correctly" perceived that 
61. Jane's response corresponds to the statement of the English-speaking subjects of the first 
test in the Kay-Kempton experiment who insisted that chip C just looked the most different, 
even after being apprised of the "name strategy." See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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the two tiles which are "more similar in color" are those correspond-
ing to B and C because her vocabulary has not led her to think of B 
and C as different colors; therefore she will have sent tile A. When 
Jane receives the two dozen tiles, she is likely to assume that: (I) Yo-
landa mistranslated what she said, (2) Maria misunderstood Yolanda's 
translation, or (3) Maria has poor color vision. If she behaves like the 
English speakers in the Kay-Kempton experiment, it will not occur to 
her that she might be "wrong" about which tiles are more similar in 
color. 
This story seems to illustrate the same kind of gap as the two tales 
of the silenced client and the silenced lawyer. Jane and Maria each 
seemed trapped in their different languages and any effort by Yolanda 
to speak for either results in "misrepresentation." The outcome is 
blamed on a "language barrier."62 Yolanda seemed to have been a 
"perfect" translator, re-presenting what each said in the language of 
the other. But what if Yolanda had viewed her translating role more 
broadly, thinking of the different languages as different ways of know-
ing the same experience? Perhaps a different story would then have 
developed as follows: 
Yolanda: Jane, which types of the three tiles do you want and in 
what quantity? 
Jane: I want two dozen of the blue tile. 
Yolanda: Jane, I'm going to have a hard time translating what you 
just said because in Maria's language the same word, siyoname, can 
refer to both green and blue. Therefore, if I just order two dozen of 
the "siyoname tile" you might end up with one of the green tiles. 
Jane: Well, isn't it still obvious to Maria that the blue tile is a 
different color from the two green tiles? 
Yolanda: Jane, it may not be as obvious as you think. Speaking 
Tarahumara has made me realize that blue and green are not always 
such different colors. Think about the ocean. We usually talk about 
the blue sea, but sometimes the ocean looks green, and sometimes it's 
hard to tell whether it's blue or green. 63 If you look at this tile [indi-
cating the tile the color of chip B] and just thought of it as "green-
blue," like Maria would, it seems to me it's closer in blueness to the 
62. Of course, it is a misnomer even in this story to see language as a barrier. Language is a 
bridge. Words are all that connect Jane and Maria; in these days of satellite and microwave 
transmissions, there is probably not even a continuous wire running between them. 
63. According to Kay and Kempton, chip G in their experiment represents an equal mixture 
of green and blue; they call that chip "a perfect aqua." Kay & Kempton, supra note 39, at 68. 
Aqua is a variation of "aquamarine," which is derived from the Latin for "sea water." See 
"Aqua," WEBSTER'S, supra note l, at 44. 
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blue tile than it is in greenness to the other green tile. 64 
Jane: Well, maybe you're right, it's not quite as obvious as I 
thought. But the only difference among the tiles is their color. How 
are we going to let Maria know which one I want? 
Yolanda: Jane, let me discuss the problem with Maria. 
Maria, I know that all three tiles are siyoname, but in English the 
color siyoname is divided into two categories, "green" and "blue." 
Jane would call one of the tiles "green" and one "blue" and the third 
would be in between. Looking at the tiles, does this make sense to 
you? 
Maria: Well, that's a useful distinction. Of course, I can see that 
the tiles are different shades of siyoname, but it would be nice to have a 
way of labeling each shade that everyone could understand because 
the color is the only difference among them. I can see that one of the 
tiles is between the other two in terms of color. But which one is 
"blue" and which one is "green"? 
Yolanda: Jane, she recognizes that this blue-green tile is between 
the other two in terms of color, but we need to figure out a way to 
identify to her the tile at one end as green and the other as blue. 
Jane: Well, tell her that one tile is the color of the sky.65 
Yolanda: Maria, the "blue" tile is a shade of siyoname that is like 
the color of the sky. 
Maria: The color of the sky at what time of day and what kind of 
weather? 
Yolanda: Jane, she wants to know the color of the sky at what 
time of day and what kind of weather. 
Jane: A clear sky at mid-day. 
Yolanda: Maria, the color of a clear sky at mid-day. 
Maria: None of the tiles is really that color. 
Yolanda: Jane, she says none of the tiles is really that color. You 
know, you should remember that a clear, mid-day sky in northern 
Mexico is probably a different color than here in New York. The alti-
tude is higher, the humidity is much less; the color is probably a much 
deeper blue than that of this blue tile. 
Jane: Well, ask her if she has any suggestions. 
Yolanda: Maria, the color of the sky here is probably a little differ-
ent than where you are because of altitude and climate. Can you think 
64. In this passage, Yolanda uses a linguistic strategy similar to that employed in the second 
Kay-Kempton test. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
65. Webster's defines "blue" as "a color whose hue is that of the clear sky." WEBSTER'S, 
supra note l, at 92. 
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of something we are all familiar with that is similar in color to one of 
the tiles at either end? 
Maria: I might say that one tile is siyoname like a leaf, 66 but we 
might run into the same problem as we did with "sky" since leaves 
may look different in our dry climate than they do in New York. I 
would say that the tile at one end is almost exactly the color of a 
turquoise. Is that helpful? 
Yolanda: Jane, she says that the tile at one end is almost exactly 
the color of a turquoise. 
Jane: Exactly! This tile we've been calling blue is really tur-
quoise. 67 That will help me match the tile to paint and carpeting. Tell 
her I'll order two dozen of the turquoise tiles. 
Yolanda: Maria, the tile Jane calls "blue" is the one that is the 
color of a turquoise. In fact she thinks turquoise is a better name for 
the color of that tile. She wants to order two dozen turquoise tiles. 
Maria: Fine. If you need to order any of the other tiles you can 
tell me "green" for the tile at the other end from the turquoise-colored 
one and "the tile in between" for the third tile. 
What was different about Yolanda's translation in the second story 
that enabled her to bridge the gap that separated Maria and Jane in 
the first story? She recognized, as a speaker of both languages, that 
English and Tarahumara imposed different conceptual structures on 
the same perceptual experience. Their different languages led Maria 
to think of the three tiles as shades of a single color while Jane sorted 
the tiles into two discrete categories. Neither siyoname nor "blue/ 
green" fully represented the particularity of their experience. Reduc-
ing their perception to a form of knowledge that could be communi-
cated, each "left out" different aspects of their experience. In order to 
translate, Yolanda enabled both Jane and Maria to rethink their per-
ceptions and thereby enrich their knowledge with what was missing in 
their language and supplied by the other. She began with Jane, point-
ing out how blue-green could be thought of as a single color, thus 
enabling Jane to "see" what she had "missed" before: that one "green 
tile" (tile B) was closer in color to the "blue" tile than to the other 
green tile. Yolanda then turned to Maria and used the idea of two 
different categories of siyoname to organize her perception of 
66. Kay and Kempton report that languages like Tarahumara that have a single word, such 
as "grue," for both green and blue, tend to contain fixed or semifixed expressions such as "grue 
like the sky I grue like the leaves" that roughly correspond to focal blue and green. Kay & 
Kempton, supra note 39, at 71. 
67. "[T]urquoise: (1) "a mineral ... consisting of a blue, bluish green, or greenish-gray ... 
that takes a high polish and changes sometimes to a green tint but when sky blue is valued as a 
gem," (2) "a variable color averaging a light greenish blue." WEBSfER's, supra note 1, at 958. 
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sryoname-colored tiles along a continuum with a tile at each end and 
one in the middle. This image of a color continuum thus bridged 
Jane's concept of two colors and Maria's understanding of blue-green 
and gave them a common ground to continue their dialogue. 68 Each 
speaker then activated other remembered experiences (beginning with 
the sky) and constituted them into words in an effort to provide more 
information and create more meaning. After several unsuccessful ef-
forts, Maria then conceptualized a shade of siyoname by analogy to a 
familiar item in her experience, turquoise. When Yolanda translated 
"turquoise,"69 Jane immediately understood what Maria meant and 
indeed found it a better, more precise name than her previous term, 
blue. They were then able to combine the image of the color contin-
uum with a common reference point for one end of the continuum to 
organize a common system for identifying the three tiles. The task of 
translation expanded the linguistic resources of each, and thus en-
hanced each other's knowledge. Jane "knew" better what color the 
ordered tile was (turquoise, not just blue) and Maria had a new word 
borrowed from English, "green," to describe the color of the tile at the 
other end of the continuum. 
In the first story, Yolanda merely re-presented what each person 
told her, and as a result ended up misrepresenting what was said. In 
the second story, Yolanda actively reshaped the way each "defined 
reality," but in doing so she did not become an autonomous creator of 
meaning, an artist making "a representation." Even though siyoname 
was, in one sense, untranslatable into English, she was not therefore 
free to give it any meaning, such as "red." Instead, as their translator, 
she represented both Jane and Maria in the third sense of taking their 
place. She first put herself into Maria's mindset and then, using her 
knowledge of English, guided Jane into understanding how Maria 
thought about the color of the three tiles. She then put herself in 
Jane's place and talked to Maria using her knowledge ofTarahumara. 
Yolanda did not substitute her own ideas for what either said. Rather, 
she helped each to say (and thus to know) more fully what they exper-
ienced. Language was the means by which both recognized the con-
68. Substantial empirical research suggests that there would be a common physiological basis 
for both Jane and Maria to think of the blue-green tile as "between" the blue and the green tiles. 
Focal green is perceived when one set of optic nerve cells fires above a base-rate stimulation, 
while focal blue is perceived when another set of cells fires above the base rate. Blue-green is 
perceived when both sets of cells are firing above the base rate. Physiologically, blue-green is 
actually a combination of, and thus "between," blue and green. G. LAKOFF, supra note 34, at 27. 
69. Of course, my story ignores a possible ambiguity, since Maria's turquoise might refer to 
the unpolished stone, which tends to be more greenish, while Jane might have thought of the 
polished gem, which is more sky blue. Fortunately, both apparently had the polished gem "in 
mind." 
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ceptual difference that separated them. The recognition of difference 
made both aware of the limits of their linguistic resources, the ways in 
which language reduced their perceptions. The result was a dialogue 
that resulted in revitalized perception and out of which was consti-
tuted new knowledge, bridging the gap that separated them. 
C. The Lawyer as Translator 
The stories of Yolanda are themselves intended to bridge my ideas 
about language and translation and my experiences of being a lawyer. 
Like more familiar forms of language, law creates knowledge by divid-
ing up the spectrum of human experience into new basic categories. 70 
But this new knowledge, like all forms of knowledge, involves a loss, a 
reduction of the particularity of experience and the perspectives of 
other understandings. (Because Jane knows that tiles A and C are dif-
ferent colors she loses what Maria still retains: the knowledge that A 
and B are more different in color than B and C.) By thinking of her-
self as a translator, the lawyer becomes aware of how, in the process of 
representing a client to others, meaning is created and lost. This 
change in meaning need not result in "misrepresentation," if, like Yo-
landa, the lawyer engages both the client and the law-speaking other 
party in dialogue that enables each to expand what they know so as to 
meet on common ground. 
Obviously, a lawyer is not just a translator. The lawyer as advo-
cate or counselor has her own agenda, which is both narrow and pur-
posive, while the translator has no personal or professional stake other 
than the task of faithful and meaningful interpretation. (The Stories of 
Yolanda might become more closely analogous to lawyering if we im-
agine that she is not merely a mutual friend but a broker in tiles inter-
ested in procuring either a sale for Maria or a purchase for Jane.) 
Thus the metaphor of lawyering as translation cannot fully express the 
meaning of the lawyer's experience, but the metaphor can help us 
think through the apparent paradox of "representation" by both illu-
minating the gap and providing a bridge. 
As the Stories of Yolanda illustrate, the lawyer as translator must 
creatively bridge at least two gaps. First, the lawyer must identify and 
cross the gap between what the client says and what can be said in the 
language of the law. Thus, in the Case of the Silenced Client, the po-
tential ambiguity in the client's admission of "guilt" between moral 
70. The language of Jaw insists that human experience fit either inside or outside its basic 
categories: guilty or not guilty, a tort or not a tort. But within each category is a vast, varied 
range of experience. This categorization at first may be as incomprehensible to the client as the 
green/blue distinction is to Maria. 
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and legal responsibility is lost if the lawyer "translates" yo soy culpable 
into a guilty plea, just as siyoname cannot be automatically translated 
as either green or blue. And the lawyer must also deal with the gap in 
meaning in the other direction, from what is said by the judge or other 
lawyers back to the client. The metaphor of translation thus chal-
lenges the lawyer to a constant process of educating herself, her client, 
and the other legal actors to the ways in which both lay and legal 
language diminish and expand what we know about experience. 
Good translation is a hard job. It is easier either to just re-present 
or to create your own representation. If the lawyer merely re-presents, 
then the client's experience may not gain legal significance. But if the 
lawyer "creates a representation," the legal significance may not be 
rooted in the client's own experience. Either way, both client and 
judge are poorly served because the failure of communication is a loss 
of potential new knowledge. In the second Yolanda story, Maria and 
Jane achieved more than a successful business transaction; by acquir-
ing insight into the other's language, each came to understand more 
about their own knowledge systems and experience. 
As illustrated by the Case of the Silenced Lawyer, it can be a mis-
take to assume that a client is interested only in "winning" the case 
rather than in understanding both "what happened" and what is hap-
pening. In that case, the student lawyers and I had made the common 
assumption that our client was interested only in an outcome mea-
sured by dollars and that he did not particularly care what route was 
used to reach that outcome. In fact, he cared very much what route 
was used, what story was told on his behalf. Words mattered very 
much to our client; one sentence in a brief submitted in his name made 
all the difference in our representation of him. 
More than anything else, this client wanted to project his inner 
mental certainty onto the world in which he lived by asserting that the 
system that very literally constrained him was fundamentally unfair. 
He wanted to give his own meaning to the events that led to his soli-
tary confinement and thereby control a world that had as its definitive 
quality the prisoner's utter lack of control. The case we planned to try 
would instead have reaffirmed the rules of the constraining system 
while giving him in return, at best, only money. 
It was this insight that caused me to entitle the second tale the 
Case of the Client Who Knew His Own Mind when I added it to this 
article at the stage of the second draft. It was our failure to recognize 
his sense of self-knowledge that caused us to misrepresent him. We 
had attempted to give our meaning to his experience as if his only 
contributions to the case were "the facts" without regard for what he 
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thought his experience meant. Instead of acting like translators, we 
had behaved rather like Jane in the first Yolanda story. We had 
looked at "the facts" and seen that it was "obvious" what legal catego-
ries made those facts meaningful. We failed to "mind the gap" and 
plunged into its depths. 
Failure to translate for the client not only risks a dissatisfied client; 
it also impoverishes the law. Like all forms of knowledge, law arises 
out of experience. Clients are the source of that experience. Their 
understanding of that experience is likely to retain elements lost in the 
legal understanding, elements that might enrich our legal knowledge. 
For example, the Sarat and Felstiner study raises interesting questions 
about the largely unquestioned wisdom of the modem trend toward 
no-fault divorce: 
Throughout their meetings with their lawyers the question of marriage 
failure remains very much alive in the minds of clients. They talk about 
the marriage in terms of guilt (their spouse's) and innocence (their 
own) .... Even though law reform makes such questions legally irrele-
vant, clients continue to think in fault terms and to attribute blame to 
their spouse. Clients use a vocabulary of personal responsibility to inter-
pret the failed marriage, and they seem to want their lawyers to accept 
and use a similar vocabulary. 
[M]ost of the time lawyers remain silent in the face of client attacks 
on their spouses. They refuse to explore the past and to participate in 
the construction of a shared vision of the social history of the mar-
riage. . .. In this way they deflect what is, for many clients, a strong 
desire to achieve some moral vindication, even in a no-fault world.71 
The lawyers could not readily translate their clients' talk of moral 
responsibility into the language of no-fault divorce law, 72 but the 
translator sees such a drastic loss of meaning as a challenge to expand 
the meaning potential of the second language. Yolanda ended up ex-
panding vocabularies in both English and Tarahumara, enabling Ma-
ria to talk about the difference between green and blue and Jane to 
describe a green-blue color with a new term, turquoise. As a transla-
tor, she "knew better" than to say that the tiles were all the same color 
or that the two "gree~" tiles were the most similar. 
If all attempts to talk about experience, to constitute it into a 
knowable form, result in reduction and incompleteness, then obviously 
this article must itself be incomplete. Thinking about law as language 
71. Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 26, at 749-50, 764. 
72. See Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 25, at 108 n.6 ("Under no-fault, the law retreats from 
moral issues and focuses instead on reaching agreements. Divorce settlements no longer lead to 
final vindication, the kind of official judgment of good and bad motives and behavior, that clients 
could once obtain through formal adjudication."). 
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and lawyering as translation will not bring me to a full understanding 
of my experience of being a lawyer nor fully communicate that experi-
ence to you. But it is a beginning. Tell tales to yourself and others 
about your own lawyering experiences and compare them to my own 
two tales. Then try on my model of experience and knowledge and 
apply the metaphor of translation; see if it "fits"; think about what 
meaning is added and left out. And then, consider writing to me so 
that this story may continue. 73 
73. My experience of writing this article as part of this symposium on legal storytelling leads 
me to hope that this concluding paragraph is more than a pious wish. As described in Kim Lane 
Scheppele's introduction to this issue, Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
2073, 2075-77 (1989), an unusually open and collegial format was created for this symposium. I 
was thus emboldened to present at my portion of the last session, not a summary of the article 
you have just read (or even an earlier draft), but instead a clinic case in which I was at that 
moment deeply involved, and which was scheduled for jury trial the following week. I presented 
to those assembled a wide variety of accounts of "what happened" taken from the police report, 
testimony at a suppression hearing, a bench opinion denying our motion to suppress, briefs, and 
the original videotaped interview with our client. I then asked for help in applying my model to 
change the way in which we had been representing our client so as to translate his understanding 
of what happened so that it would be heard by the judge and jury. The suggestions were varied 
and thought-provoking (including at least one comment that this new case demonstrated the 
inadequacy of the translation model). I then took what I had learned by talking about the case in 
the symposium and indeed changed the way we were representing the client. The case is now 
over and I am still reading transcripts and trying to understand "what happened" and what that 
experience means. But, as more experienced storytellers than I know to say at this point, that is 
another story . . • . 
